Why is Ukraine involving itself in the Sahel?

While Russian involvement in Africa has a long but chequered history, the entry of Ukraine into the hotbed Sahelian region, raises the stakes considerably. Taken in conjunction with Ukraine’s more recent incursions into Russia itself, what does this development in Africa presage? Analysis by Neil Ford.

Russian military deployments in Africa have been well documented, with the Wagner Group supplying mercenaries to conflicts from Mali to Mozambique. However, Ukraine now also appears to be entering the African arena in an attempt to confront Russian forces.

It is unlikely to win the war against Moscow on African soil but recent attacks on Malian soldiers and Russian troops seem to be part of a growing tendency by foreign powers to use African conflicts to further their own aims.

A large number of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries were killed by Tuareg rebels, apparently using Ukrainian intelligence, in fighting over several days in late July near Tinzaouaten in northeast Mali. There have been varying reports on the number of fatalities but the Tuareg separatists put the number at 84 Russians and 47 Malian soldiers. Russian officials also conceded that one of their commanders had been killed and a Russian helicopter destroyed.

Reports in the region say that the Tuareg forces were backed by fighters from Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a local offshoot of al-Qaeda. The Tuareg separatists and Islamists are not a single unified force. The closeness of their relationship has fluctuated over recent years but they currently often work together, as the Tuareg forces fight to create an independent state in the north of the country.

There was surprise in the region and beyond when Andriy Yusov, a Ukraine military intelligence spokesperson, said that the rebels had been given “the necessary information, and not just information, which enabled a successful military operation”.

The revelation may or may not have been planned but has not been denied by Kiev. It is interesting that Ukraine was in a position to be able to pass on such useful information about military movements in the Sahel. It is not believed to have significant intelligence capability in the Sahel or elsewhere in Africa but may have just that within Russian mercenary circles.

Even once it had relevant information, it would have had to reach out to the Tuareg group involved. Ukrainian media have also reported that Ukrainian forces have trained the separatists in using attack drones.

Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the government of Ukraine was “pandering to terrorist groups in countries on the continent friendly to Moscow” to open up a second front.

The claim also triggered an instant reaction from the military government of Mali, with both it and the government of neighbouring Niger cutting diplomatic ties with Ukraine.

The current military junta controlling Mali seized power in 2020 and again in 2021, claiming on both occasions that the existing civilian governments were incapable of countering the northern rebels. It cut ties with the French government, which had previously backed Bamako militarily, with French and UN forces pulling out to be replaced by Wagner fighters.

Indeed, the civilian governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have all been overthrown by their respective armies, with militant activity a factor in all three cases.

In a meeting in early July, the junta leaders of the three countries – General Abdourahamane Tchiani of Niger, Colonel Assimi Goïta of Mali and Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré – said that they were ‘irrevocably’ rejecting the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) bloc in favour of creating their own group, the Alliance of Sahel States. They also plan to set up their own common currency in place of the CFA franc, which is backed by France and the EU.

Although other Ecowas member states are concerned by Islamist activity in the north of the region, they generally do not consider military rule to be a valid
response to the threat. They have therefore pressurised the new regimes in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou to return their countries to civilian rule, including through sanctions. Relations across the region are therefore strained, with the three junta-led governments isolated from the rest of West Africa.

New incarnation of the Wagner Group

Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin launched an apparent attempted coup against Russian President Vladimir Putin last year, resulting in Wagner being sidelined and then brought under tighter Russian army control. As a result, Russian mercenaries in Africa are now provided by the Africa Corps, a new incarnation of the Wagner Group, which had already operated in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique and the Central African Republic, as well as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

They have helped the Malian government fight Tuareg rebels for the past two years, although the separatists retain control of much of northern Mali, which they have now held for more than a decade, renaming the area Azawad.

Wagner, the Africa Corps or other Russian interests appear to have concluded agreements to supply troops and weapons in support of various African governments in return for mining or other raw materials rights.

Despite the demands on Russian manpower from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian mercenaries remain
active in a number of other African countries. There have been claims that it is supplying the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war, with repeated reports that Ukrainian special forces are supporting the other side in the conflict.

It is difficult to understand why both Russia and Ukraine appear prepared to commit resources to African conflicts at a time when they are under pressure in their own war. Yet although the recent attacks may make Russian forces a little more conservative in their offensive actions in Mali, they are unlikely to have long-term implications for the war. Moreover, Russia and the Africa Corps are unlikely to be able to provide Bamako with more forces or other forms of support.

Diplomatic fallout

However, the attacks do have wider geopolitical implications for both Ukraine and Africa more generally. In particular, Kiev’s involvement in the attacks will affect its efforts to strengthen its diplomatic influence in Africa.

A considerable number of African governments have been unwilling to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, partly because of historic ties to Moscow forged during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union broke up, Russia inherited the country’s former international ties, leaving Ukraine and the other former Soviet republics with limited connections to African states.

Apart from its role shipping grain and other basic foodstuffs to the continent, Ukrainian involvement in Africa has been fairly limited over the past three decades. However, Kiev has sought to increase its influence over the past two years, with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba embarking on African tours four times over that period, most recently to Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia in August.

It had only eight embassies on the continent in early 2022 but is now rapidly building up that network to a planned 20 in an effort to counter Russian diplomacy.

Ukrainian support for Sahelian rebel forces could put this at risk. Senegal has condemned Ukraine’s actions, while Ecowas as a body emphasised in a statement its “firm disapproval and firm condemnation of any outside interference in the region which could constitute a threat to peace and security in West Africa and any attempt aiming to draw the region into current geopolitical confrontations”. It was the involvement of the al-Qaeda affiliate in the Tinzaouaten attacks that most shocked the region.

The international community may underestimate just how concerned other West African countries are by militant activity further north in the region. An incredible 43% of all global terrorism-related deaths in 2022 occurred in the Sahel and many ethnic and linguistic groups in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria spread across their northern borders. At the same time, millions of people from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger work further south, sending much-needed remittances home.

Their presence is opposed by some in the south and these tensions could grow if the three states actually do leave Ecowas because these migrant workers will then lose their right to live and work in the rest of the bloc. Anything that raises tensions in the region is therefore very unwelcome but support for Islamist militants particularly so.

Battleground of the world

Ukraine’s desire to counter Russian influence and military power wherever possible is entirely understandable given Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the involvement of both Russia and Ukraine in Africa draws parallels with the Cold War, when Western and Soviet governments used Africa and Southeast Asia in particular as battlegrounds for their conflict, usually through proxy forces.

The same can be said of both World Wars, with East Africa and North Africa hosting many battles between European armies.

Other foreign powers also appear to be becoming involved in internal African conflicts, with the UAE and Iran in particular alleged to be arming the combatants in Sudan. A real trend of non-African governments using the continent to further their own political and military ends appears to be growing. It is difficult to know how to prevent such interventions but Africa is tired of providing battlefields for the world.